



THE POTENTIAL ABUSE OF THE SUBPOENA POWER UNDER 
THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE 
Jeffrey D. Coren* 
INTRODUCTION 
Grand jury subpoenas traditionally serve two important functions:  
investigatory tools for prosecutors and protections against unfounded 
criminal prosecutions.1  In practice, a grand jury subpoena often acts 
as a “blank check” for federal prosecutors to investigate crimes.2  As a 
result, subpoenas have a potentially dangerous third purpose as after-
the-fact insurance policies to validate an unlawful search.  The sub-
poena power takes on this more troublesome role when combined 
with the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, 
which permits the introduction of evidence seized pursuant to an 
unlawful search if that evidence would have been “inevitably” discov-
ered without the constitutional violation.3 
This Comment will discuss the government’s potential abuse of 
the subpoena power in light of the inevitable discovery doctrine.  In 
the wake of the Enron investigation and subsequent corporate scan-
dals, white-collar criminal investigations have received increased at-
tention and funding from federal prosecutors.4  White-collar investi-
gation is often document-heavy, and subpoenas are a common 
investigatory tool used by federal prosecutors.5  Thus, the potential 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, 2009, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 2006, Duke University. 
 1 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686–87 (1972) (“[T]he grand jury . . . has the dual 
function of determining if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been com-
mitted and of protecting citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions.”); see also 
United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 423–25 (1983) (describing the purposes of 
the grand jury). 
 2 William J. Stuntz, Commentary, O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth 
Amendment, 114 HARV. L. REV. 842, 864 (2001). 
 3 See infra Part I.A. 
 4 See Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 IND. 
L.J. 411, 423–24 (2007) (“With the . . . implosion of Enron . . . federal and state govern-
ments have stretched their resources to increase prosecution of white-collar 
crime . . . . substantially increas[ing] prosecutorial . . . resources . . . [for] white-collar in-
vestigations of corporations and their executives.”). 
 5 See J. KELLY STRADER, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 14 (2d ed. 2002) (“Most of 
the evidence in white collar cases is not obtained by searches and seizures, but rather by 
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for Fourth Amendment violations in the government’s abuse of the 
subpoena power is becoming increasingly significant.  Moreover, in 
Hudson v. Michigan, the Supreme Court arguably expanded the in-
terpretation of inevitable discovery by asking what “hypothetically 
could have happened had the police acted lawfully in the first place.”6  
As a result, courts may be more willing to admit otherwise improper 
evidence because it could have been obtained through a grand jury 
subpoena.  This Comment seeks to identify the most likely situations 
for unchecked governmental abuse of subpoenas and proposes that 
courts carefully apply the inevitable discovery doctrine to grand jury 
subpoenas. 
Part I will briefly examine the development of the exclusionary 
rule and the inevitable discovery doctrine.  The application of the in-
evitable discovery doctrine will be analyzed in light of Hudson v. 
Michigan, where the Court suggested a broad application of the inevi-
table discovery doctrine.  Next, the purpose of the exclusionary rule 
will be contrasted with the purpose of a grand jury subpoena.  This 
will emphasize the distinct role that the subpoena plays as an investi-
gatory tool for federal prosecutors.  Finally, this section will examine 
circuit courts that have specifically addressed the issue of applying the 
inevitable discovery exception to subpoenas.  It will also explore how 
the Supreme Court’s application of the inevitable discovery doctrine 
in Hudson may suggest how lower courts will apply the doctrine to 
grand jury subpoenas. 
Part II will examine the recent case of United States v. Vilar7 in the 
Southern District of New York.  This case provides an excellent forum 
in which to examine the application of the inevitable discovery doc-
trine to grand jury subpoenas.  Moreover, this case illustrates how 
prosecutors may potentially abuse the subpoena power without 
proper judicial vigilance. 
Part III will divide the application of the exclusionary rule to 
grand jury subpoenas into three categories based on the chronology 
of events.  Each of the categories will then be analyzed according to 
the likelihood that courts will apply inevitable discovery and the po-
tential for governmental abuse.  In each case, it will be assumed that 
an invalid search has occurred, such as a warrantless search or an 
 
voluntary responses to grand jury subpoenas.”); see also Stuntz, supra note 2, at 857 
(“[M]ost white-collar criminal investigations . . . involve[] the heavy use of subpoenas, not 
searches.”). 
 6 547 U.S. 586, 616 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 7 530 F. Supp. 2d 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
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overbroad search warrant.  The first category is when subpoenas are 
issued prior to, or concurrently with, the unconstitutional search.  
The second category is when subpoenas are issued after the invalid 
search has occurred.  The final category is when an invalid search has 
occurred, but no subpoena has been issued.  This analysis will dem-
onstrate that, as the issuance of a subpoena moves further after the 
initial search, courts should be less likely to extend the inevitable dis-
covery exception.  Yet, this Comment will argue that even the first 
category—the chronology most similar to classic inevitable discovery 
and independent source doctrines—presents a dangerous situation 
for abuse of the subpoena power. 
Part IV will suggest that courts be especially wary when the gov-
ernment attempts to use subpoenas as a source of inevitable discov-
ery.  In particular, courts should be more vigilant regarding the first 
category—when the subpoena is issued prior to the unconstitutional 
search—which is also the most likely scenario in which courts may in-
voke the inevitable discovery doctrine.  This first chronology may 
seem harmless on its face, but in fact it opens the door for potential 
widespread abuse.  If prosecutors can use their subpoena power to 
create a “safety net” of inevitable discovery, then police officers would 
be given an incentive to perform questionable, or even outright un-
constitutional, searches and seizures. 
I.  THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE AND GRAND 
JURY SUBPOENAS 
A.  The Exclusionary Rule and the Inevitable Discovery Exception 
The exclusionary rule prohibits the introduction of evidence 
which was seized as a result of an unlawful search.8  The exclusionary 
rule also prohibits the introduction of certain derivative evidence, or 
“fruit of the poisonous tree.”9  The main justification for the rule is to 
deter unconstitutional police conduct and violations of the Fourth 
 
 8 The federal exclusionary rule was first adopted in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 
(1914).  The rule was subsequently applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment 
in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
 9 See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984) (“[T]he exclusionary rule reaches 
not only primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure, but 
also evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality or ‘fruit of the 
poisonous tree.’” (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 383; Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 
341 (1939))). 
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Amendment.10  However, the Supreme Court has recognized excep-
tions to the exclusionary rule when the deterrence rationale does not 
hold.11  These exceptions include attenuation,12 good faith,13 and the 
independent source doctrine.14  Such exceptions generally apply 
when “[i]nvoking the exclusionary rule would put the police (and so-
ciety) not in the same position they would have occupied if no viola-
tion occurred, but in a worse one.”15 
One important exception to the exclusionary rule is “inevitable 
discovery,” which the Supreme Court first adopted in Nix v. Williams.16  
The inevitable discovery exception provides that tainted evidence 
should not be excluded “[i]f the prosecution can establish by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevi-
tably would have been discovered by lawful means” absent the illegal 
search.17  Although it is related to the independent source doctrine,18 
the inevitable discovery doctrine requires the court to determine, 
“viewing affairs as they existed at the instant before the unlawful 
search, what would have happened had the unlawful search never oc-
curred.”19  Given the “hypothetical” nature of this determination,20 
 
 10 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (“[T]he [exclusionary] rule is a 
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally 
through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party ag-
grieved.”). 
 11 See Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998) (explaining that the exclusion-
ary rule is “applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its ‘substantial social 
costs’” (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984))). 
 12 The causal connection between the unlawful action and the seizure may be “so attenu-
ated as to dissipate the taint.”  Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963) 
(quoting Nardone, 308 U.S. at 341). 
 13 The exclusionary rule should not be applied when officers act in “objectively reasonable 
reliance on a subsequently invalidated search warrant.”  Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. 
 14 The independent source doctrine permits the introduction of tainted derivative evidence 
if the evidence was discovered pursuant to an existing independent source, rather than 
the unlawful act.  For further explanation, see Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 
(1988), Segura, 468 U.S. at 796, and Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 
(1920). 
 15 Murray, 487 U.S. at 541. 
 16 467 U.S. 431 (1984). 
 17 Id. at 444. 
 18 See Murray, 487 U.S. at 539 (“The inevitable discovery doctrine, with its distinct require-
ments, is in reality an extrapolation from the independent source doctrine:  Since the 
tainted evidence would be admissible if in fact discovered through an independent 
source, it should be admissible if it inevitably would have been discovered.”). 
 19 United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 861 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 20 Inevitable discovery is based on historical facts.  See Nix, 467 U.S. at 445 n.5 (“[I]nevitable 
discovery involves no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts 
capable of ready verification or impeachment.”).  However, the inevitable discovery ex-
ception requires applying these historical facts to a hypothetical “what if” scenario. 
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lower courts have applied the inevitable discovery exceptions to a 
wide range of situations.21 
In 2006, the Supreme Court considered the scope of the inevita-
ble discovery exception in Hudson v. Michigan.22  Hudson presented 
the issue of whether evidence seized while performing a warranted 
search should be excluded given the failure of police to “knock and 
announce” before entering the residence, and the question pre-
sented to the Court on certiorari specifically addressed the inevitable 
discovery exception.23  Yet, the majority opinion only referenced in-
evitable discovery by implication.24  The Court never mentioned the 
term “inevitable discovery,” nor cited Silverthorne or Nix.25  Justice 
Scalia, in one brief sentence, simply mentioned that “[w]hether that 
preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the police would have exe-
cuted the warrant they had obtained, and would have discovered the 
gun and drugs inside the house.”26  With this statement, the Court 
posed an almost counter-factual hypothetical to determine inevitabil-
ity. 
While the majority in Hudson offered a pithy discussion of inevita-
ble discovery, the dissent offered a detailed critique of Scalia’s inter-
pretation of the doctrine.  Justice Breyer argued that the majority 
“misunderstands the inevitable discovery doctrine.”27  Instead of pos-
ing a counter-factual scenario to determine inevitability, the dissent 
provided a definition of inevitable discovery more closely tied to the 
independent source doctrine.  As Breyer explained, “[the inevitable 
discovery doctrine] does not refer to discovery that would have taken 
place if the police behavior in question had (contrary to fact) been 
 
 21 Courts often apply the inevitable discovery exception to inventory searches, search war-
rants, and searches incident to arrest.  See Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, What Circum-
stances Fall Within “Inevitable Discovery” Exception to Rule Precluding Admission, in Criminal 
Case, of Evidence Obtained in Violation of Federal Constitution, 81 A.L.R. FED. 331, 332 (2007) 
(listing common inevitable discovery applications). 
 22 547 U.S. 586 (2005). 
 23 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, id. (No. 04-1360), 2005 WL 856040 (presenting the 
question:  “Does the inevitable discovery doctrine create a per se exception to the exclu-
sionary rule for evidence seized after a Fourth Amendment ‘knock and announce’ viola-
tion . . . or is evidence subject to suppression after such violations . . . ?”). 
 24 See Chris Blair, Hudson v. Michigan:  The Supreme Court Knocks and Announces the Demise of 
the Exclusionary Rule, 42 TULSA L. REV. 751, 754 (2007) (“The Court also seemed to sug-
gest that the exclusionary rule would not apply because the evidence would have inevita-
bly been discovered.”). 
 25 David J.R. Frakt, Fruitless Poisonous Trees in a Parallel Universe:  Hudson v. Michigan, Knock-
and-Announce, and the Exclusionary Rule, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 714 (2007). 
 26 Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592. 
 27 Id. at 616 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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lawful.”28  Rather, it “refers to discovery that did occur or that would 
have occurred (1) despite (not simply in the absence of) the unlawful 
behavior and (2) independently of that unlawful behavior.”29 
As the dissent recognized, Scalia’s reasoning provides an excep-
tionally broad interpretation of the inevitable discovery exception.  
Notably, the majority’s interpretation ignores the traditional view of 
inevitable discovery, which required that the “inevitable” seizure oc-
cur independently from the unlawful event.30  Instead, the majority in 
Hudson expands the applicability of inevitable discovery to counter-
factual scenarios created by the court. 
Professor Frakt even contends that “by relying on not what did 
happen, but what could have happened, Hudson in effect creates a 
whole new exception—what might be called the parallel universe excep-
tion to the exclusionary rule.”31  Rather than create a new exception, 
Frakt’s “parallel universe” exception could just as easily be considered 
an expansion of the inevitable discovery rule.  Under this new expan-
sive inevitable discovery doctrine, “courts must ask the following 
question:  if the same officers had conducted the same search, but 
doing only what they were authorized to do under the Constitution, 
would they have found the same evidence?”32  This broad reading of 
the inevitable discovery doctrine, which ignores the requirement for 
an independent source, would allow courts to more easily apply the 
doctrine when presented with unlawful police conduct. 
With regard to Hudson’s impact on the Court’s Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, “both liberal and conservative scholars consider 
the case a major blow to the exclusionary rule.”33  In a somewhat ex-
treme view, Professor Chris Blair suggests that the Court’s reasoning 
in Hudson signals a more general shift on the Court towards the de-
mise of the exclusionary rule itself.34  In applying Hudson, lower 
courts have recognized Hudson’s narrow holding that violating the 
 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 See id. (“The inevitable discovery exception rests upon the principle that the remedial 
purposes of the exclusionary rule are not served by suppressing evidence discovered 
through a ‘later, lawful seizure’ that is ‘genuinely independent of an earlier, tainted one.’” 
(citing Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 (1988))). 
 31 Frakt, supra note 25, at 715. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 661. 
 34 See Blair, supra note 24, at 751 (“The more long-range effect [of Hudson v. Michigan], 
however, may be the actual demise of the exclusionary rule itself.”). 
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knock-and-announce rule does not require suppression.35  Yet, some 
courts have begun to expand Hudson’s narrow holding to other 
methods of entry used by police officers when executing a warrant.36 
The long-term implications of Hudson on the inevitable discovery 
doctrine remain uncertain.  Joshua Dressler notes that “the Court did 
not . . . expressly describe [its reasoning] as inevitable discovery” and 
predicts that “the implications for Hudson for the inevitable-discovery 
doctrine are fuzzy at best.”37  At least one court has explicitly recog-
nized “[t]he Court’s reliance on the inevitability of discovery in Hud-
son.”38  Other courts have implicitly recognized Hudson’s impact on 
inevitable discovery.  For example, in United States v. Hector,39 the 
Ninth Circuit considered whether to exclude evidence of a search be-
cause the defendant was not provided with a copy of the search war-
rant.  Although the court did not use the term “inevitable discovery,” 
it examined Hudson and reasoned that “[r]egardless of whether the 
police officers had actually shown Hector the search warrant, they 
would have executed it and recovered the drugs and firearms inside 
his apartment.”40 
On the other hand, different courts have concluded that Hudson 
involved an expansion of the attenuation doctrine, not inevitable dis-
covery.41  At least one court has explicitly denounced Hudson’s influ-
ence on inevitable discovery, reasoning that the “the majority opinion 
in Hudson is about causation and not about the inevitable discovery 
doctrine.”42  Thus, while the wider impact of Hudson on the inevitable 
discovery doctrine remains unclear, some courts have interpreted the 
case to expand the scope of inevitable discovery. 
At a minimum, Hudson demonstrates the importance of the inevi-
table discovery doctrine with regard to the suppression of evidence.  
 
 35 See, e.g., United States v. Ankeny, 502 F.3d 829, 835 (9th Cir. 2007) (“The Court held [in 
Hudson] that violation of the knock-and-announce rule did not merit suppression of evi-
dence found in the search . . . .”). 
 36 See id. at 838 (holding that the use of flash-bang devices and rubber bullets upon entry 
into the home does not require suppression under Hudson); United States v. Makki, No. 
06-20324, 2007 WL 1100453, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 12, 2007) (finding that failure to pro-
vide defendant with the list of items to be seized upon executing the search warrant does 
not require suppression under Hudson). 
 37 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 32 (4th 
ed. Supp. 2007). 
 38 State v. Jackson, 742 N.W.2d 163, 178 (Minn. 2007). 
 39 474 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 40 Id. at 1155. 
 41 See, e.g., State v. Worwood, 164 P.3d 397 (Utah 2007); Royce v. State, No. A05-882, 2006 
WL 2347786 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2006). 
 42 State v. Callaghan, 222 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Tex. App. 2007). 
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One particularly troubling application of the inevitable discovery 
doctrine involves the use of grand jury subpoenas.  Left unchecked, 
the government may potentially abuse its subpoena power by creating 
a “safety net” to sanitize otherwise unlawful searches. 
B.  The Role of Grand Jury Subpoenas 
Rooted in Anglo-American history,43 the requirement of a grand 
jury in the federal criminal system is firmly established in the Fifth 
Amendment.44  The grand jury serves both an investigatory function 
and as a protection against unfounded government prosecution.45  
Thus, the grand jury acts as a “fourth branch”46 of government, with a 
“special role in insuring fair and effective law enforcement.”47  To ac-
complish this important task, grand juries are afforded broad investi-
gatory powers including the ability to compel testimony.48  As a result, 
“[t]he federal grand jury is the most powerful weapon in the prosecu-
tor’s arsenal.”49  Federal prosecutors are given broad discretion to de-
cide when to investigate and prosecute crimes, often employing 
grand juries to facilitate their investigations.50 
 
 43 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 342 (1974) (“The institution of the grand jury 
is deeply rooted in Anglo-American history.”); see also Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 
359, 362 (1956) (discussing the history of the grand jury as an English institution). 
 44 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise in-
famous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury . . . .”). 
 45 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 46 See John F. Decker, Legislating Federalism:  The Call for Grand Jury Reform in the States, 58 
OKLA. L. REV. 341, 350 (2005) (“The grand jury . . . is an independent body of citizens, 
sometimes described as a fourth branch of the government.”); see also United States v. 
Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992) (explaining that the grand jury “serv[es] as a kind of 
buffer or referee between the Government and the people”); United States v. Mandu-
jano, 425 U.S. 564, 571 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he grand jury continues to func-
tion as a barrier to reckless or unfounded charges.”). 
 47 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343. 
 48 See id. at 345 (“The power of a federal court to compel persons to appear and testify be-
fore a grand jury is . . . firmly established.”); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 
(1972) (holding that testimony can be compelled under the Fifth Amendment). 
 49 Anthony A. Joseph & William D. Jones III, A Grand Jury Primer for Corporate Representation, 
63 ALA. LAW. 227, 227 (2002). 
 50 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (describing the discretion of 
federal prosecutors to bring charges before a grand jury).  However, the discretion of the 
prosecutor is not without limitations.  See James F. Holderman & Charles B. Redfern, Pre-
indictment Prosecutorial Conduct in the Federal System Revisited, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
527, 537–38 (2006) (“[A] federal prosecutor cannot use the grand jury for the sole or 
dominant purpose of:  (1) obtaining additional evidence on charges already made against 
an indicted defendant, or (2) eliciting evidence for a civil case.  A prosecutor also cannot 
use the grand jury . . . in the search for a fugitive in whose testimony the grand jury has 
no interest.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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By initiating a grand jury investigation, federal prosecutors open 
the door to a powerful and judicially sanctioned investigatory tool:  
the subpoena.  The grand jury may serve a subpoena to compel tes-
timony or the production of documents.51  Although the subpoena is 
authorized by the court, the content of a grand jury subpoena at the 
time of issuance is at the discretion of the prosecutor.  Unlike war-
rants, subpoenas are traditionally served without prior judicial ap-
proval.52  Moreover, the issuance of a grand jury subpoena does not 
necessarily require prior grand jury approval.53  As a result, the “al-
most limitless subpoena power” is “something akin to a blank check” 
for federal prosecutors.54  Some limitations on the grand jury’s sub-
poena power do exist.  For example, subpoenas may not be issued to 
prepare for trial, gather evidence for a civil case, intimidate a witness, 
or conduct an interview.55  Except for these limitations, the initial de-
cision to issue a subpoena and the subpoena’s content are at the sole 
discretion of the prosecutor. 
Grand jury subpoenas enjoy a presumption of legitimacy.56  De-
fendants may move to quash or modify a subpoena only “if compli-
ance would be unreasonable or oppressive.”57  For example, subpoe-
nas may be quashed if they are overly broad, unreasonable in time 
frame, or not described with particularity.58  However, the success rate 
of quashing a subpoena is predictably low.59  A party seeking to quash 
 
 51 See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 372 (1911) (declaring that a subpoena duces 
tecum has the “power to compel the production of documents . . . . [and] may be en-
forced independently of [a witness’s] testimony”). 
 52 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a) (“The clerk must issue a blank subpoena—signed and sealed—
to the party requesting it, and that party must fill in the blanks before the subpoena is 
served.”). 
 53 See, e.g., Lopez v. Dep’t of Justice, 393 F.3d 1345, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“The prosecutor 
may issue the subpoena without the knowledge of the grand jury, but his authority to do 
so is grounded in the grand jury investigation, not the prosecutor’s own inquiry.”). 
 54 See Stuntz, supra note 2, at 861, 864. 
 55 For further discussion on a grand jury’s limitations, see Holderman & Redfern, supra note 
50, at 540, and Joseph & Jones, supra note 49, at 227. 
 56 See United States v. R. Enters., 498 U.S. 292, 300 (1991) (“[T]he law presumes, absent a 
strong showing to the contrary, that a grand jury acts within the legitimate scope of its au-
thority.”). 
 57 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2). 
 58 See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 429 F.3d 140, 149 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[A] party seeking 
such a subpoena must establish:  (1) the subpoenaed document is relevant, (2) it is ad-
missible, and (3) that it has been requested with adequate specificity.”). 
 59 See Constitutional Rights and the Grand Jury:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 80 (2000) (statement of Andrew D. Leipold, 
Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law) (“[T]he standards for quashing a 
subpoena are government-friendly. . . . [T]he success rate of these motions is predictably 
low.”). 
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a subpoena based on reasonableness must overcome a high hurdle,60 
and it is equally difficult to quash a subpoena based on constitutional 
challenges.61  Thus, aside from motions on the grounds of privilege,62 
motions to quash are rarely successful.  When balancing the grand 
jury’s need for a full investigation against the rights of individuals, 
courts generally prefer to give the grand jury—and thus the federal 
prosecutor—sweeping investigatory authority with little judicial over-
sight. 
C.  Applying the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine to Grand Jury Subpoenas 
Historically, subpoenas have been the subject of exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule.  In 1920, the exclusionary rule and grand jury sub-
poenas clashed in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.63  In Silver-
thorne, federal agents illegally searched the business of the defendants 
and seized certain documents.  The district court ordered that the 
unlawfully seized items be returned.  The government, armed with 
the knowledge from the illegal search, then served a subpoena on the 
defendants to produce the same documents which had been illegally 
seized and returned.  The Supreme Court condemned the govern-
ment’s two-step plan to circumvent the Fourth Amendment, holding 
that it “reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words.”64  Reaf-
firming the exclusionary rule set out in Weeks v. United States,65 the 
Court proclaimed that evidence which was unlawfully seized “shall 
not be used at all” and cannot be the basis for a subpoena.66  Al-
though this case laid the groundwork for the independent source 
 
 60 See R. Enters., 498 U.S. at 301 (holding that when “a subpoena is challenged on relevancy 
grounds, the motion to quash must be denied unless the district court determines that 
there is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the Government seeks will 
produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury’s investigation”). 
 61 Subpoenas may also be challenged on First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment grounds.  
However, the likelihood of success on these motions to quash is also low.  See United 
States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 27 (2000) (holding that the Fifth Amendment’s protection 
against self-incrimination may apply when producing documents in compliance with a 
subpoena); Donovan v. Lone Steer, Inc., 464 U.S. 408 (1984) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment requires a subpoena to be reasonable); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 
667 (1972) (holding that the First Amendment does not absolutely protect reporters 
from testifying before a grand jury). 
 62 Subpoenas may be quashed or modified when the documents requested are privileged.  
See, e.g., CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 2 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 3D 
§ 275 (2007). 
 63 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
 64 Id. at 392. 
 65  232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 66 Id. 
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doctrine,67 the Court held that in this instance “the knowledge gained 
by the Government’s own wrong cannot be used by it in the way pro-
posed.”68  As Silverthorne illustrates, the potential for abuse of the sub-
poena power is not a new phenomenon.  Rather, the struggle be-
tween subpoenas and the exclusionary rule began almost 
immediately after the Court first adopted the exclusionary rule in 
1914.69 
Circuit courts have directly addressed the conflict between the in-
evitable discovery doctrine and grand jury subpoenas.  In United States 
v. Eng, the Second Circuit concluded that the issuance of a subpoena 
may be sufficient to satisfy the inevitable discovery exception.70  In 
Eng, the defendant was under investigation by the Drug Enforcement 
Administration and the Internal Revenue Service for narcotics and 
money laundering.71  As part of its investigation, the government sub-
poenaed various bank records.  After two months, the government 
arrested Eng and seized materials from his private safe without a war-
rant.  Subsequently, the government subpoenaed various other bank 
records. 
Eng moved to suppress the evidence from the safe and any deriva-
tive evidence from the subpoenas.  The district court denied the mo-
tion, applying the inevitable discovery doctrine due to the pre-search 
subpoenas.72  After remanding the case for “particularized findings,” 
the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s findings and its appli-
cation of the inevitable discovery doctrine.73 
Importantly, the Second Circuit affirmed that subpoenas are suffi-
cient to trigger inevitable discovery.  As Anthony Girese explains, “the 
main thrust of [Eng] . . . [is that] the inevitable discovery doctrine 
may be applied to evidence obtained pursuant to pre- or post-
illegality subpoenas, or even to evidence that would have been sub-
poenaed.”74  In order to reach this conclusion, the court distin-
 
 67 See id. (“Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained become sacred and 
inaccessible.  If knowledge of them is gained from an independent source they may be 
proved like any others . . . .”). 
 68 Id. 
 69 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 70 971 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 71 Id. at 856. 
 72 See id. at 864 (stating that “the challenged evidence inevitably would have been discov-
ered”). 
 73 United States v. Eng, 997 F.2d 987, 988 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 74 Anthony J. Girese, They Would Have Found It Anyway:  United States v. Eng and the “Inevita-
ble Subpoena,” 59 BROOK. L. REV. 461, 492 (1993) (emphasis omitted). 
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guished a prior case, United States v. Roberts,75 which found that an out-
standing subpoena was insufficient to conclude that discovery was in-
evitable.  By distinguishing Roberts, the court rejected the defendant’s 
argument that “the subpoena power never may be relied upon by the 
government to meet the inevitable discovery burden of proof.”76  
Rather, the Second Circuit opened the door for using the subpoena 
power as a basis for inevitable discovery: 
The circumstances revealed in Roberts, which made it unlikely that the 
subpoena would produce any evidence, must be contrasted with a situa-
tion where the government can demonstrate a substantial and convinc-
ing basis for believing that the requisite information would have been ob-
tained by subpoena.  Where the government is able to make such a 
demonstration, there is no reason why the government may not rely 
upon the subpoena power as one way it might meet the burden of prov-
ing inevitable discovery by a preponderance of the evidence.77 
However, the Second Circuit expressed concerns about applying 
the inevitable discovery exception to subpoenas, urging that “special 
care is required on the part of a district court when the government 
relies on the subpoena power.”78  The court required that the gov-
ernment show “that both issuance of the subpoena, and a response to 
the subpoena producing the evidence in question, were inevitable.”79  
The Second Circuit was primarily concerned with the difference be-
tween subpoenas and search warrants, reiterating its concerns in Rob-
erts that “the recipient of a subpoena may falsely claim to have lost or 
destroyed the documents called for, or may even deliberately conceal 
or destroy them after service of the subpoena.”80  In closing, the court 
warned that “subpoenas must not serve as an after the fact ‘insurance 
policy’ to ‘validate’ an unlawful search under the inevitable discovery 
doctrine.”81 
The Ninth Circuit has expressed similar concerns about the dan-
gers of the subpoena power.  In Center Art Galleries—Hawaii, Inc. v. 
United States,82 the government served subpoenas after executing nu-
merous warranted seizures.  The district court held the warrants to be 
overbroad and ordered the return of the seized property.  The gov-
 
 75 852 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1988) (listing instances in which a subpoena would not lead to the 
return of documents). 
 76 Eng, 971 F.2d at 860 (emphasis omitted). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Roberts, 852 F.2d at 676. 
 81 Eng, 971 F.2d at 861 (emphasis added). 
 82 875 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir. 1989). 
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ernment appealed the order, arguing that the evidence would have 
been inevitably discovered via the subpoenas.  The Ninth Circuit re-
jected this argument, holding that “the [inevitable discovery] doc-
trine will not be applied to validate an illegal seizure when inevitable 
discovery is predicated upon a subpoena served to compel produc-
tion of the seized items.”83  The district court emphasized the poten-
tial dangers of applying the government’s subpoena power to inevita-
ble discovery: 
[T]he subpoenas were served after the search and seizure.  At the time 
the subpoenas were served there was nothing left to discover.  This leads 
to the inevitable conclusion that the subpoenas were used as an “insur-
ance policy” in the event of a subsequent invalidation of the search and 
seizure.  This should not be permitted.  Such a rule would allow the gov-
ernment to violate the Fourth Amendment with impunity as long as they 
could obtain a subpoena.84 
Relying heavily on the Second Circuit’s decision in Roberts, the Ninth 
Circuit also condemned the use of the subpoena as an after-the-fact 
“insurance policy.”85  The court reasoned that: 
The mere fact that the government serves a subpoena, however, does not 
mean that it will obtain the documents it requests.  A subpoena can be 
invalid for a variety of reasons, as when it is unduly burdensome, when it 
violates the right against self-incrimination, or when it calls for privileged 
documents . . . .86 
It is important to note that this case was decided before the Second 
Circuit’s rulings in Eng.  More recently, the Ninth Circuit has ap-
proved the application of the inevitable discovery doctrine to sub-
poenas in some circumstances.87 
Given that the long-term impact of Hudson on the inevitable dis-
covery doctrine remains unclear,88 Hudson’s impact on the applica-
tion of the inevitable discovery exception to grand jury subpoenas is 
also unknown.  Assuming arguendo that lower courts interpret Hud-
son as providing a broad interpretation of the inevitable discovery 
doctrine,89 it follows that courts will be able to more easily apply the 
 
 83 Id. at 755. 
 84 In re Motion for Return of Property Pursuant to Rule 41, Fed. Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, 681 F. Supp. 677, 687 (D. Haw. 1988). 
 85 Ctr. Art Galleries, 875 F.2d at 755. 
 86 Id. at 754 (citing United States v. Roberts, 852 F.2d 671, 675 (2d Cir. 1988)). 
 87 See United States v. Hazelwood, 40 F. App’x 347, 350 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming the appli-
cation of inevitable discovery to bank records that “could readily have been obtained via 
subpoenas on the banks”). 
 88 See supra Part I.A. 
 89 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing the “parallel universe” exception in 
Hudson). 
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doctrine in the future.  Under this expanded doctrine, lower courts 
may be more willing to justify inevitable discovery based on a poten-
tial grand jury subpoena.  Regardless, subpoenas have already been 
recognized by various circuit courts as a basis for inevitable discovery.  
Even if courts do not interpret Hudson as expanding the scope of in-
evitable discovery, it seems likely that courts will continue to rely on 
grand jury subpoenas to support a finding of inevitable discovery. 
II.  CASE STUDY OF THE POTENTIAL DANGERS OF AN “INEVITABLE” 
SUBPOENA:  UNITED STATES V. VILAR 
Already a powerful investigatory tool, the subpoena becomes even 
more potent when combined with the inevitable discovery exception 
to the exclusionary rule.  If left unchecked, the subpoena power may 
be used as an “insurance policy” to validate otherwise unlawful 
searches.90  Given that subpoenas are issued with little judicial over-
sight and with few limitations, there is considerable potential for gov-
ernmental abuse.  This potential government abuse can take many 
forms.  For example, knowing that the prosecutor can always “fall 
back” on a subpoena to declare evidence inevitably discoverable, offi-
cers may intentionally perform unlawful searches to gain evidence.  
Another apt example of abuse, as illustrated by the case discussed be-
low, is that prosecutors will issue subpoenas concurrently with search 
warrants as “backup” plans.  The potential for abuse would be magni-
fied if lower courts interpret the inevitable discovery exception 
broadly under Hudson, often allowing subpoenas to provide a basis 
for “inevitability.” 
A recent case illustrating the potential danger of the inevitable 
discovery exception is United States v. Vilar.91  In Vilar, the government 
executed a search warrant upon the offices of Amerindo on suspicion 
of securities fraud and other charges.  The Government seized 
around 170 boxes of documents and 30 computers during the search, 
which took around twelve hours.92  While the search was being exe-
cuted—and after sensitive information had already been seized—the 
defendant’s attorney negotiated with the Assistant United States At-
 
 90 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 91 530 F. Supp. 2d 616, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that evidence recovered during a 
search conducted while defendant negotiated with the Government is admissible under 
inevitable discovery rule); see also United States v. Vilar, No. S305CR621KMK, 2007 WL 
1075041 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2007). 
 92 Vilar, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 620. 
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torney (“AUSA”) to accept a grand jury subpoena if the government 
ceased its search.93 
In subsequent proceedings, the district court partly suppressed 
findings from the search for violating probable cause, particularity, 
and reasonableness.94  As a result, evidence discovered under the in-
valid portions of the warrant was excluded.  However, “given the 
more relaxed relevancy requirements applied in evaluating a sub-
poena,” there was a “broader set of documents that could be lawfully 
pursued by means of the Subpoena rather than by means of the War-
rant.”95  This “created a category of documents that . . . were illegally 
seized from Amerindo’s office pursuant to . . . the Warrant, [but] fell 
within the scope . . . of the Subpoena.”96 
The government argued that the challenged documents should 
be admissible based on the inevitable discovery and independent 
source exceptions to the exclusionary rule.  Put simply, the govern-
ment contended that the documents would have inevitably been dis-
covered via the subpoena, regardless of the invalid portions of the 
search warrant.  The district court agreed, holding that the docu-
ments were admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.97  The 
court declined to accept the defendant’s argument that the unlawful 
search itself—and thus the subsequent discussion between the de-
fense attorney and the AUSA—triggered the subpoena. 
Relying on the Second Circuit’s opinion in Eng,98 the district court 
applied the inevitable discovery exception to the subpoena.  The dis-
trict court looked to four factors.  First, the court found that the sub-
poena “was not issued on the basis of information unlawfully gained 
from Amerindo.”99  In other words, there was “no concern that, in de-
termining the contents of the Subpoena, the Government relied 
upon information obtained during the course of the initial search.”100  
Second, the government “established by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the Subpoena was the product of an ‘active and ongoing 
investigation’ into suspected wrongdoing by Defendants.”101  Third, 
the court found that “absent the invalid portions of the War-
 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 96 Id.  These documents are referred to as the “Challenged Documents.” 
 97 Id. at 632. 
 98 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
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rant, . . . the Government would have inevitably issued the Subpoena” 
after speaking with the defense attorney.102  Specifically, the court rea-
soned that the invalid portions of the warrant did not prompt the de-
fense attorney’s discussion with the AUSA.103  Fourth, the government 
established that “(1) [d]efendants would have inevitably produced 
the Challenged Documents in response to the Subpoena, and 
(2) none of the concerns listed in Roberts [such as lost, concealed, or 
destroyed documents] would have presented an obstacle to the dis-
covery of the Challenged Documents.”104  As support for this last find-
ing, the court relied on instances when “[d]efendants repeatedly and 
unambiguously stated their intention to cooperate with the Govern-
ment’s lawful requests for documents.”105 
Vilar illustrates an ideal scenario with the potential for govern-
ment abuse.  The defendants in Vilar recognized such dangers, argu-
ing that the subpoena was an “insurance policy” to validate the over-
broad warrant.  The trial court disagreed, finding that “the 
Government issued the Subpoena not to cure any defects in the War-
rant, but to provide an added incentive to Amerindo to provide the 
sought-after materials.”106  Consequently, the court “rejected Defen-
dants’ assertion that the Government ‘viewed the Subpoena as some 
sort of an insurance policy against a shaky warrant.’”107  Nevertheless, 
Vilar is an excellent example of a situation in which the government 
may abuse its subpoena power as a contingency plan for questionable 
warrants.  Even if the government does not intentionally act to cir-
cumvent the Fourth Amendment, Vilar demonstrates the power of 
the inevitable discovery exception, if interpreted too broadly, to by-
pass protections against unreasonable searches or seizures. 
III.  INEVITABILITY OF ISSUANCE AND INEVITABILITY OF COMPLIANCE:  
THREE CHRONOLOGICAL SCENARIOS OF ILLEGAL SEARCHES AND 
SUBPOENAS 
In the context of an unlawful search, the determination of 
whether a subpoena is sufficient to trigger the inevitable discovery 
exception can be separated into two elements:  inevitability of issu-
 
102 Id. at 628. 
103 Id. at 629. 
104 Id. at 631. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 630 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
107 Id. 
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ance and inevitability of production.108  Both elements are necessary 
to prove inevitable discovery.  “Inevitability of issuance” can be de-
fined as whether a subpoena would have been inevitably issued but-
for the unlawful search.  This first inquiry asks what the government 
would have done absent the unlawful conduct.  “Inevitability of pro-
duction” (or compliance) is whether the evidence would have been 
inevitably produced by the subpoenaed party.  This second inquiry 
involves predicting the defendant’s response absent the unlawful event.  
Using Vilar as an example, elements one through three in the Vilar 
test determine inevitability of issuance by questioning what informa-
tion the government relied upon and predicting how the government 
would have acted.  On the other hand, element four in the Vilar test 
asks, almost verbatim, whether documents would have been inevitably 
produced by the defendant.109 
In order to determine that evidence would have been inevitably 
discovered, both the requirements of inevitable “issuance” and “pro-
duction” must be satisfied.  As the Second Circuit recognized in Eng, 
“the government must show that both issuance of the subpoena, and 
a response to the subpoena producing the evidence in question, were 
inevitable.”110  Anthony Girese considers this dual requirement to be 
the “key safeguard for the exclusionary rule.”111  Notably, the difficulty 
in satisfying these two elements depends upon the facts in each case.  
Some factors the court may consider include the nature of the sub-
poena’s target and the scope of the investigation.112  Another impor-
tant question to consider is at what point in the investigation the sub-
poena was issued, if one was issued at all.  To answer this vital 
question, the court must carefully evaluate the chronological se-
quence of events. 
Assuming the existence of an unlawful search, three chronological 
scenarios emerge in which a court could rely on a grand jury sub-
poena to invoke the inevitable discovery exception.  In the first in-
stance, a subpoena is issued prior to the unlawful search.  This situa-
tion most closely resembles the traditional independent source 
rationale and is most likely to trigger inevitable discovery.  In the sec-
ond instance, a subpoena is issued concurrently with the illegal 
 
108 See Girese, supra note 74, at 498. 
109 See Vilar, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 627 (explaining that the government is required to establish 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged documents would have been in-
evitably discovered without relying upon the unlawfully gained information). 
110 United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1992). 
111 Girese, supra note 74, at 496–98. 
112 See id. at 499–500. 
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search or soon thereafter.  When the subpoena is issued after the 
search, it becomes more difficult to demonstrate inevitability, because 
the subpoena may be based on evidence which was unlawfully ob-
tained.  Moreover, this scenario often calls the motivations of the 
government into question, and the court may very well suspect that 
the subpoena is being utilized as a “backup plan” to the seemingly 
unlawful search.  In the third instance, an unlawful search occurred, 
but no subpoena is issued.  This is the most difficult scenario for the 
government to demonstrate inevitable discovery.  In all three of these 
scenarios, courts must be aware of the subpoena’s potential for abuse 
when applying the inevitable discovery exception. 
A.  Scenario 1:  Issuance of a Subpoena Prior to the Unlawful Search 
Of the three scenarios presented, the issuance of a subpoena prior 
to the unlawful search is the most likely to implicate the inevitable 
discovery exception.  In this situation, the subpoena is issued prior to 
the unlawful search, so there is no fear that the issuance of the sub-
poena was tainted by the unlawful act.  Thus, it can easily be demon-
strated that the subpoena was inevitably issued.  The most significant 
problem with demonstrating inevitability in this instance is proving 
inevitable production.  In other words, the court cannot simply as-
sume that the target of a subpoena will produce all of the documents 
requested in the subpoena.  As the Second Circuit recognized in Rob-
erts, the target of a subpoena can destroy or conceal the requested re-
cords.113  As a result, the court will need to examine the facts in each 
case to determine whether the party would have produced the re-
quested documents.  For example, in Vilar, the court looked to 
statements by the defendant and his attorney which promised com-
pliance with the subpoena.114 
Putting aside the difficulty of demonstrating the inevitability of 
production, subpoenas issued prior to the unlawful search most 
closely fit the traditional application of inevitable discovery.  The exis-
tence of a prior independent source—the prior subpoena—
resembles the facts in Nix, where a search party began looking for the 
victim’s body prior to the unlawful confession.115  Given that the 
 
113 See United States v. Roberts, 852 F.2d 671, 676 (2d Cir. 1988). 
114 See Vilar, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 631. 
115 See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 449–50 (1984) (“On this record it is clear that the 
search parties were approaching the actual location of the body, and . . . that the volun-
teer search teams would have resumed the search had Williams not earlier led the police 
to the body and the body inevitably would have been found.”). 
  
Feb. 2009] POTENTIAL ABUSE OF THE SUBPOENA 773 
 
Court’s acceptance of the inevitable discovery exception in Nix was 
supported as an extension of the independent source doctrine,116 the 
presence of a prior subpoena would present a strong case for its ap-
plication.  Thus, courts would be most likely to invoke the inevitable 
discovery doctrine in this first scenario, when a subpoena is issued 
prior to the unlawful police conduct. 
In addition, this first scenario search appears to have the least po-
tential for abuse.  In this case, the government’s use of the subpoena 
power seems to conform to its intended purpose as an investigatory 
tool.  For example, with the knowledge gained from a suspect’s re-
sponses to a subpoena, the government may establish the necessary 
probable cause to serve a valid search warrant on the suspect.  With-
out the knowledge that its future search would be declared invalid, 
the government’s motive regarding the initial subpoena appears to 
be genuine. 
However, it is still possible that a prosecutor may think strategi-
cally and issue the prior subpoena as an “insurance policy.”  Conse-
quently, while this first scenario appears on its face to have minimal 
potential for abuse, the actual potential for governmental misconduct 
is enormous.  In response, courts should be as wary of applying inevi-
table discovery to a prior subpoena as they may be in other situations.  
Specifically, courts must scrutinize the facts to determine whether 
production of the subpoenaed documents was inevitable.  When in 
doubt, courts should err on the side of caution and assume that ques-
tionable documents may have been lost or that a party may have re-
fused to produce them. 
B.  Scenario 2:  Issuance of a Subpoena Concurrently With or After the 
Unlawful Search 
When the subpoena is issued after the unlawful search, courts will 
be less likely to invoke the inevitable discovery exception.  In addition 
to the usual problems associated with the inevitability of production, 
this scenario also begins to question the inevitability of issuance, be-
cause a subpoena may have been issued based on information which 
was unlawfully obtained.  As the Second Circuit recognized, “the 
Government must establish that the investigation was not ‘trig-
ger[ed]’ . . . by the information unlawfully gained by the illegal 
 
116 See id. at 443–44 (noting the functional similarity between the independent source doc-
trine and the inevitable discovery exception). 
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search.”117  For example, the first factor in the Vilar test was that “the 
Subpoena was issued independently of any information obtained by 
means of the unlawful portions of the Warrant.”118  Thus, at least 
some courts have recognized the uncertainty regarding the inevitabil-
ity of issuance in this scenario.  As a result, a subpoena issued after an 
unlawful search receives more scrutiny from the court and is less like-
ly to invoke the inevitable discovery exception. 
Moreover, the potential for governmental abuse greatly increases 
when subpoenas are issued concurrently with, or after, an unlawful 
search.  This second scenario often calls the government’s motives 
into question.  In these cases, the issuance of subpoenas begins to 
look like the dreaded “insurance policy” criticized by the Second and 
Ninth Circuits.119  Within this scenario, two problematic series of 
events may occur. 
In the first series of events, the government issues a subpoena af-
ter the unlawful search but before a court rules upon the admissibility 
of the evidence.  In this instance, the government would not yet know 
whether its search will be upheld upon a motion to suppress.  The 
“worst case” scenario is as follows:  worried that the fruits of its search 
may eventually be suppressed, the government issues subpoenas for 
the same evidence discovered in the search.  Although this disin-
genuous motive will not be true in all cases, this sequence of events 
should signal caution when courts evaluate arguments of inevitable 
discovery.  As the Second Circuit recognized in Eng, “[p]articular 
care is appropriate where . . . subpoenas are issued after or at the 
time of the unlawful search . . . .”120  While the most questionable 
subpoenas in Eng were issued after the unlawful search, troublesome 
subpoenas may also be issued concurrently with an unlawful search.121 
In the second series of events, the government issues a subpoena 
after a search has already been declared unlawful or invalid by the 
court.  In this instance, the government’s motives are more transpar-
ent, and case law demonstrates that this obvious attempt to circum-
vent the Fourth Amendment would not likely be upheld.  As the Su-
preme Court made clear in Silverthorne, the government cannot 
perform an illegal search, have the documents suppressed, and then 
 
117 Vilar, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 625 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Eng, 971 
F.2d 854, 871 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
118 Id. at 634. 
119 Eng, 971 F.2d at 861 (quoting Ctr. Art Galleries v. United States, 875 F.2d 747, 755 (9th 
Cir. 1989)). 
120 Id. at 860. 
121 See supra Part II (discussing Vilar, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 616). 
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subpoena the identical documents.122  The Court held that such an 
action “reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words” because 
“[t]he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence 
in a certain way is . . . not merely . . . [that the evidence] shall not be 
used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.”123  Consistent 
with Silverthorne, courts are unlikely to accept an argument of inevita-
ble discovery when the requested documents have already been sup-
pressed prior to the issuance of a subpoena. 
C.  Scenario 3:  Unlawful Search Without the Issuance of a Subpoena 
In the third scenario, the government attempts to rely on the in-
evitable discovery exception after a search has been declared unlaw-
ful, even though no subpoena has been issued.  This is the least likely 
scenario for invoking the inevitable discovery exception, because the 
government must overcome significant hurdles to demonstrate both 
inevitability of issuance and inevitability of production.  Here, the 
question of issuance becomes central, since prosecutors are arguing 
that although no subpoena was issued, the government would have 
hypothetically (and inevitably) issued a subpoena absent the unlawful 
search.  In the prior scenarios, the government must simply demon-
strate that it would have acted similarly (by issuing a subpoena) absent 
the unlawful event.  However, in this final scenario the government 
must prove that it would have acted differently (and actually issued a 
subpoena) but-for the unlawful search. 
The Second Circuit opened the possibility of this third scenario in 
Eng.  On remand, the district court noted that “the presence or ab-
sence of a post-search subpoena is irrelevant to the question of 
whether the government inevitably would have discovered the evi-
dence absent the primary illegality.”124  The court recognized that “ac-
tual issuance [of a subpoena] is not a prerequisite for the application 
of the inevitable discovery doctrine.  Sufficient proof that such sub-
poenas would have issued will demonstrate inevitability.”125  Upon 
opening the door to an inevitable subpoena, the Second Circuit also 
recognized that “special care is required on the part of a district court 
when the government relies on the subpoena power.”126  In addition 
 
122 See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391–92 (1920) (holding that 
evidence gathered from the subpoena must be excluded). 
123 Id. at 392 (emphasis added). 
124 United States v. Eng, 819 F. Supp. 1198, 1224 (E.D.N.Y 1993). 
125 Girese, supra note 74, at 502. 
126 United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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to requiring proof of both issuance and production, the Court in-
sisted on “a substantial degree of directness in the government’s 
chain of discovery argument, rather than a hypothesized ‘leapfrog-
ging’ . . . until the piece of evidence is reached.”127  This Second Cir-
cuit test applies to all three chronological scenarios, but the test 
makes it most difficult to prove inevitable discovery in cases where no 
subpoena had been issued. 
Although proving “inevitable issuance” in this scenario is a daunt-
ing task, it is not impossible.  In fact, proving the inevitable issuance 
of a subpoena may be easier than proving the inevitable issuance of a 
warrant.128  To prove the “inevitable” issuance of a warrant, the gov-
ernment would need to demonstrate that a neutral magistrate would 
have approved the warrant application upon a showing of sufficient 
probable cause.129  Yet, since subpoenas are issued at the discretion of 
prosecutors with little judicial oversight,130 such a showing is unneces-
sary to demonstrate the inevitability of issuance concerning subpoe-
nas.  Nevertheless, demonstrating both issuance and production 
when no subpoena had been issued is a difficult task.  Consequently, 
courts are least likely to apply inevitable discovery in this third sce-
nario. 
In addition, this scenario presents the most troubling situation for 
abuse of the subpoena power.131  Without the need to have a pre-
existing or even a post-search subpoena, this argument can be made 
in many more cases.  If courts accept this argument with regularity, 
prosecutors will be able to introduce tainted evidence with relative 
ease, essentially bypassing the warrant requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment.132  Moreover, contrary to the purposes of the exclusion-
ary rule,133 this may incentivize police officers to perform unlawful 
searches and seizures, knowing that such violations can easily be 
 
127 Id. 
128 See Girese, supra note 74, at 493 (distinguishing the “inevitable subpoena” from the “inevi-
table warrant”). 
129 See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 540 (1988). 
130 See supra Part I.B. 
131 See id. (expressing uneasiness about the Second Circuit’s acceptance of the “inevitable 
subpoena” argument in Eng). 
132 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people . . . against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable 
cause . . . .”). 
133 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (6th Cir. 1974) (clarifying that the pur-
pose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police behavior). 
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cured.  Thus, frequent acceptance of this third scenario has the po-
tential to warp the exclusionary rule itself.134 
IV.  CLOSE JUDICIAL SCRUTINY AND CASE-BY-CASE ANALYSIS IS 
REQUIRED TO AVOID GOVERNMENTAL ABUSE OF THE SUBPOENA POWER 
The Second Circuit test in Eng is an excellent example of how 
courts should scrutinize grand jury subpoenas in the context of inevi-
table discovery.  Most importantly, courts should follow Eng’s dual in-
evitability requirement by demanding that the government prove 
both “inevitability of issuance” and “inevitability of production.”  
Moreover, determining whether the government meets each re-
quirement involves a careful case-by-case analysis.  Among the many 
factors that the court should consider, the chronological sequence of 
events—specifically when the subpoena was issued—should be a key 
element in the analysis.  As evidenced by the three chronological sce-
narios, the likelihood of courts applying the inevitable discovery ex-
ception should be reduced as the issuance of the subpoena moves 
further after the unlawful event.  At the same time, the potential for 
abuse of the subpoena power becomes greater as issuance moves fur-
ther from the unlawful search.  This sliding scale, if applied properly, 
would strike a delicate balance between allowing exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule, while still preserving the rule’s purpose of deter-
ring unlawful police behavior. 
At first glance, the Second Circuit test appears to have adequately 
protected individuals from potential governmental abuse of the sub-
poena power.  However, it is important to recognize that courts must 
always be wary when invoking the inevitable discovery rule based on 
subpoenas.  Notably, judicial vigilance is equally necessary in the first 
chronological scenario, even though the government’s motives may 
appear to be genuine.  As subpoenas become a more widely used tool 
by prosecutors in white collar investigations, even this first scenario 
has the potential for abuse.  If police officers learn that a prior sub-
poena signals a “green light” for unlawful searches, this may encour-
age the exact police behavior that the exclusionary rule is meant to 
deter. 
 
134 Regular acceptance of any of the exclusionary rule exceptions may also warp the exclu-
sionary rule.  However, this third scenario could be used most frequently, since it does 
not require the issuance of a subpoena at all.  Therefore, the dangers of this scenario are 
more pronounced than in other circumstances. 
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In order to prevent this scenario, courts must carefully examine 
the motives of the government when invoking the inevitable discov-
ery argument based on a prior subpoena.  This examination is neces-
sary for all three chronological scenarios, but may often be over-
looked in the context of prior subpoenas.  Although prior subpoenas 
generally serve important investigatory functions, these subpoenas 
may still act as an “insurance policy” against unlawful searches if left 
unchecked. 
When a subpoena has been issued, courts should carefully evalu-
ate subpoenas to determine the subpoena’s boundaries and scope.  
Unlike warrants, which usually require the court to review the scope 
of the warrant prior to its issuance, courts have little influence on the 
scope of subpoenas when they are initially issued.  As a result, courts 
should carefully consider the scope of subpoenas—exactly what doc-
uments the subpoenas requested and how specifically they requested 
those documents—to determine the inevitability of production.  Only 
when the subpoena is sufficiently detailed should a court determine 
that compliance with the subpoena would have been inevitable.  
Moreover, courts should examine the egregiousness of the unlawful 
search.  By examining the context surrounding the unlawful search, 
the court can also infer the government’s motives in issuing the sub-
poena.  Courts should favor subpoenas which are used as investiga-
tory tools over subpoenas designed to bypass Fourth Amendment 
protections regarding searches. 
Regardless of when a subpoena is issued (if one has been issued at 
all), courts must always bear in mind that the target of subpoenas will 
not always fully comply with the government’s requests.  Although 
courts may want to believe that all law-abiding citizens will produce 
the requested documents, this assumption would not properly reflect 
the dynamics of a grand jury investigation.135  Rather, unless the gov-
ernment can point to specific facts demonstrating a likelihood of 
compliance, courts should err on the side of caution concerning the 
inevitability of production.  For example, in Vilar the court relied 
upon statements made by the defendant and his attorney promising 
that the defendant would produce the requested documents.136  Al-
 
135 See supra note 80 and accompanying text (describing concerns in United States v. Roberts, 
852 F.2d 671 (2d Cir. 1988)). 
136 United States v. Vilar, 530 F. Supp. 2d 161, 631 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[T]he Government has 
pointed to multiple instances—both before, during, and after the Government’s search 
of Amerindo’s office—wherein . . . Defendants repeatedly and unambiguously stated 
their intention to cooperate with the Government’s lawful requests for documents in this 
case.”). 
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though one could easily question whether such statements are suffi-
cient proof of “inevitable compliance,” such an inquiry is vital to 
demonstrate inevitable discovery.  If courts fail to question whether 
issuance and production are both inevitable, then courts will fail to 
protect individuals from the potential abuse of the subpoena power. 
With proper judicial oversight, subpoenas can act as the source of 
inevitable discovery without distorting the purpose of the exclusion-
ary rule.  At its core, the exclusionary rule is designed to discourage 
unlawful police behavior.  Only when the exceptions to the rule be-
gin to encourage unlawful police behavior—such as searching with-
out a proper warrant—do the exceptions run the risk of swallowing 
the rule altogether.137  Due to the relative ease of obtaining subpoenas 
and their prevalence as an investigatory tool, such fears are more 
pronounced in the context of subpoenas.  These fears are magnified 
by the Supreme Court’s arguably broad interpretation of inevitable 
discovery in Hudson.  However, such fears need not be realized.  Care-
ful judicial scrutiny should be applied in all three chronological sce-
narios, limiting the frequency with which inevitable discovery is in-
voked based on grand jury subpoenas. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the subpoena power has the potential for government 
abuse when used in connection with the inevitable discovery doc-
trine, careful attention by courts to both “inevitable issuance” and 
“inevitable production” can thwart such abuse.  Three chronological 
scenarios exist when invoking the inevitable discovery exception 
based upon grand jury subpoenas:  (1) prior issued subpoenas; 
(2) subsequently or concurrently issued subpoenas; and (3) non-
issued subpoenas.  While the last two scenarios have the most poten-
tial for abuse, the first scenario is equally dangerous and also requires 
heightened judicial scrutiny.  Courts must carefully evaluate both the 
scope of the subpoena and the motives behind the government’s is-
suance of the subpoena.  By limiting the application of inevitable dis-
covery in the context of subpoenas, courts can maintain the integrity 
of the exclusionary rule. 
 
 
137 United States v. Eng, 971 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1992) (recognizing “the need to prevent 
the inevitable discovery exception from swallowing the exclusionary rule”). 
